Encryption Doesn't Stop Insider Threats

When the Real Danger is Inside the Department

325+
Law enforcement employees disciplined for database misuse (2013-2015)
AP Investigation
$30K+
Bribes allegedly taken by one NYPD officer alone
Nguyen Indictment
200+
Database screenshots found on one dispatcher's phone
Calgary Case

The Pattern of Insider Abuse

40+ Documented Cases Across the United States and Beyond

Police departments claim encryption protects sensitive information. But case after case proves the real threat isn't outsiders with scanners—it's insiders with access.

Types of Insider Corruption

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Selling Database Access

Employees sell access to NCIC, state databases, and law enforcement systems for cash.

Cases: Van Buren (GA), Allen (LA), Thomas (AL), Simpkins (NJ)
!

Tipping Off Criminals

Dispatchers and employees warn targets about upcoming raids, investigations, and warrants.

Cases: Graham (NJ), Strang (AZ), Buonincontri (Calgary)
+

Aiding Drug Operations

Officers actively assist drug trafficking organizations with intelligence and protection.

Cases: Nguyen (NYPD), Abreu (NYPD), Juarez (Houston)
*

Aiding Extremist Groups

Law enforcement personnel leak information to extremist organizations and gangs.

Cases: Lamond (DC/Proud Boys), OC Dispatcher (white supremacist gang)

Documented Cases

A Growing Record of Insider Corruption

Name Agency Year What Happened Outcome
Andrew Nguyen NYPD NY 2025 Queried databases for drug dealers, offered to arrest rivals for payment, took $30K+ in bribes Indicted
Amaury Abreu NYPD (113th Precinct) NY 2016-2020 Leaked law enforcement info to international cocaine trafficking ring connected to Dominican Republic 33 months prison
Marian Buonincontri Calgary 911 (Alberta, Canada) 🇨🇦 2022-2023 Fed police database info to rival gang members; 200+ screenshots of database searches found on phone Pled guilty
Samantha Simpkins Millville Police Department NJ 2024-2025 Accessed restricted data from police and judiciary databases, shared with unauthorized persons Charged Feb 2026
Kathy Anne Graham Lavallette Police Department NJ 2013 Warned drug ring members (including her daughter) about impending raids Arrested
Shane Lamond DC Metropolitan Police DC 2020-2023 Leaked info to Proud Boys leader Enrique Tarrio, tipped him about arrest warrant Convicted Dec 2024
Noe Juarez Houston Police Department TX 2015 Provided law enforcement info to Los Zetas cartel, ran plates, shared police tactics, supplied weapons 30+ years prison
Destiny Allen Mansfield Police Department LA Recent Sold NCIC and state database access for personal financial gain Charged with malfeasance
Nathan Van Buren Cumming Police Department GA 2015 Sold license plate lookups from NCIC for $5,000 Conviction overturned (SCOTUS)
Stephen Greany New Bedford Police Department MA 1999 Sold identity of undercover State Police trooper to cocaine dealer Convicted
Derrick Thomas Gardendale Police Department AL 2011-2014 Queried NCIC for non-law enforcement purposes, provided info to acquaintance Pled guilty
Unnamed Dispatcher Orange County Sheriff's Department CA 2008 Provided confidential info to white supremacist gang, solicited beatings of inmates Indicted
Christopher Strang Maricopa County Sheriff's Office AZ 2008 Tipped off gambling ring suspects about raids, gave list of 150 deputies involved 43 counts hindering prosecution
Christopher Barr Jacksonville Sheriff's Office FL 2024 Used protected databases to provide law enforcement info to criminals connected to gang activity Resigned, charged with computer crimes
Patrick Driscoll Salt Lake City (IT Employee) UT 2021 Accessed police databases to provide info about undercover operations to human trafficker Charged with felony computer crimes
Leon Morrell South Carolina Dept. of Corrections SC 2024 Accepted Cash App payments from inmates in exchange for security video and classified operational info Charged: money laundering, obstruction, misconduct
Joseph Bongiovanni DEA Federal 2024 Provided law enforcement sensitive info about investigations, informant identities, and tactics to drug traffickers 5 years federal prison
Paul Campo DEA (Deputy Chief, Financial Ops) Federal 2025 Conspired to traffic drugs and launder millions for Jalisco New Generation Cartel Indicted Dec 2025
Lamar Coody Detroit Police Department MI 2022 Leaked information to drug dealer under investigation, jeopardizing investigation and officer safety 12 months prison
Nune Gevorkyan Federal Court Clerk's Office (Los Angeles) CA 2013 Accessed sealed court documents to tip off Armenian Power organized crime members before arrests 6 months federal prison
Ivan Reyes Arzate Mexican Federal Police (SIU Commander) 🇲🇽 2016 Took $290K bribe to disclose pending DEA investigation to Sinaloa Cartel associates Indicted in Brooklyn
Toronto Police Officers Toronto Police Service (Ontario, Canada) 🇨🇦 2026 Leaked database info to organized crime, data used for extortion and shootings in tow-truck turf wars Multiple charges pending
Multiple Officers (514+ suspected leaks) Swedish National Police (Sweden) 🇸🇪 2018-2024 Gang members infiltrated police through relationships; 30+ officers leaked info on ongoing cases, witness locations National scandal, investigation ongoing
Jorge J. Jimenez U.S. Border Patrol (Arizona) AZ 2024 Took $20K per vehicle to let cartel drug loads pass through checkpoint without inspection 78 months federal prison
Manuel Perez Jr. Customs and Border Protection TX 2023-2024 Allegedly affiliated with La Línea/Juárez cartel; received $2,500 per undocumented person; may have received $400K Held without bond, pending trial
Leonard George Customs and Border Protection TX 2022 Took $17K-$68K per vehicle to let meth and drug-laden vehicles through border checkpoint 23 years federal prison
Emanuel Isac Celedon Customs and Border Protection (Laredo) TX 2023 Connected with Cartel del Noreste; smuggled aliens and cocaine through his inspection lane 117 months federal prison
Milton Gaston & Bruce Williams Washington & Humphreys County Sheriffs (MS) MS 2025 Two sheriffs + 12 officers took bribes to provide armed escorts for FBI agents posing as cartel Federal indictments
Deputy Cox Wayne County Sheriff's Office (NC) NC 2018-2024 Former narcotics head protected drug traffickers under guise they were informants; traded protection for pills 6+ years federal prison
Kenneth Collins Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department CA 2024 Used position to ensure drug loads were successfully transported for $250,000 17.5 years federal prison
Charles McGonigal FBI (Former Counterintelligence Chief) Federal 2023 Leaked info about CEFC investigation and pending arrests; took money from Russian oligarch Convicted, sentenced 2024
David Paitsel FBI (Strategic Technology Unit) Federal 2023 Used FBI database to sell personal info of private citizens to real estate scheme 24 months federal prison
14 TDCJ Officers Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice (McConnell Unit) TX 2024 Racketeering enterprise smuggled phones, drugs; inmates used phones for criminal coordination 7 pled guilty to racketeering
Michael O'Flaherty NY State Police (VGNET) NY 2024 Investigator warned drug dealer of FBI investigation, told him to destroy evidence, tried to identify confidential informant Arrested Nov 2024; facing 40+ years
Justin Riggs Maryland State Police MD 2023-2025 10-year veteran leaked investigation details to drug distributor including tracker info, informant existence; had $34K in maxed credit cards 6 years federal prison (June 2025)
Jasmine Garcia Arvin Police Department CA 2025 Property/Evidence Tech accessed homicide case files, leaked evidence photo; may have passed info to homicide suspect's sister Arrested March 2025; $250K bail
Robin Conyers St. Petersburg Police Department FL 2024 Charged with unlawful use of communication device and misuse of confidential police information Charged June 2024
Timothy Barnhardt Toronto Police Service (Ontario, Canada) 🇨🇦 2026 Leaked info about corrections officer to criminal network 'key figure' for purpose of murder; sparked Project South investigation 17 charges; denied bail Feb 2026
Lucy Langmead South Wales Police (United Kingdom) 🇬🇧 2020-2022 Repeatedly accessed secure databases for 21 months to leak intel on drug dealer boyfriend's criminal associates Nearly 3 years prison (2025)

Note: This is not an exhaustive list. Many cases go unreported or are handled through internal discipline without public disclosure. The AP found over 325 employees disciplined in just a 3-year period—most of those cases never made headlines.

The AP Investigation: A Systemic Problem

325+ Disciplined in 3 Years—And That's Just What We Know

In 2016, the Associated Press conducted a nationwide investigation into police database misuse. What they found was staggering.

325+

Fired, Suspended, or Resigned

Law enforcement officers and employees disciplined for database misuse between 2013-2015.

250+

Lesser Discipline

Additional staff received reprimands, counseling, or other discipline.

90+

Unknown Outcomes

Cases where discipline status was unclear or undisclosed.

0

Agencies Tracking Nationwide

No single agency tracks how often this abuse happens across the country.

State-Level Findings

California 75+ violations
Florida 400+ violations (2014-2015)
Colorado 35+ violations
Indiana 12+ cases
"In the most egregious cases, officers have used information to stalk or harass, or have tampered with or sold records they obtained... Violations are committed by patrol officers, dispatchers, civilian employees, court personnel and high-ranking police officials." — Associated Press, 2016

A Global Problem

Insider Threats Know No Borders

Insider corruption isn't unique to the United States. Similar patterns emerge wherever law enforcement personnel have access to sensitive systems.

🇸🇪

Sweden: 514+ Suspected Leaks

A 2024 investigation revealed gang members systematically infiltrated Swedish police through romantic relationships and family connections. At least 30 officers leaked information about ongoing investigations, witness locations, and pending operations.

"Sleeping with the enemy—gang criminals got hold of sensitive information through police girlfriends, family members, and compromised colleagues."
🇨🇦

Canada: Calgary & Toronto

A Calgary 911 operator fed database screenshots to rival gang members (200+ found on her phone). Toronto police officers leaked information used in tow-truck turf wars that led to shootings and extortion.

🇺🇸🇲🇽

U.S. Border: Cartel Infiltration

CBP officers have taken bribes ranging from $2,500 per person to $68,000 per drug-laden vehicle. One officer was allegedly a full member of the Juárez cartel. The largest law enforcement agency in the country has been systematically targeted.

The Pattern is Universal

Whether it's Calgary 911 operators, Swedish police girlfriends, CBP officers at the border, or Chicago cops—criminals target insiders, not scanners. Radio encryption addresses none of this.

Why Encryption Makes This Worse

The Security Theater That Hides Real Threats

Insiders Have Access Regardless of Encryption

Encryption protects information from outsiders. But dispatchers, officers, and civilian employees are insiders. They have legitimate access to databases, radio systems, and confidential information. Encryption doesn't change that.

Before Encryption

  • Public could monitor police activity
  • Journalists could verify official accounts
  • Citizens could document misconduct
  • Corrupt insiders still had access
  • Public oversight created accountability pressure

After Encryption

  • Public cannot monitor police activity
  • Journalists cannot verify official accounts
  • Citizens cannot document misconduct
  • Corrupt insiders still have access
  • No public oversight = no accountability pressure

The Only Thing That Changed

Encryption didn't remove insider access. It removed public oversight. The people most likely to abuse the system still have full access. The people who could detect that abuse no longer can.

Encrypted Departments Can Hide These Scandals

When corruption occurs in an encrypted department:

  • No public record: There's no scanner archive to review for suspicious patterns
  • FOIA reveals nothing: Encrypted communications leave no trail the public can request
  • Internal cover-ups easier: Without outside documentation, departments control the narrative
  • Pattern detection impossible: The public can't identify when multiple incidents suggest systemic problems

What Actually Prevents Insider Threats

Real Security Measures—Not Radio Silence

If departments genuinely cared about preventing insider threats, they would implement these proven security measures—none of which require blocking public scanner access.

1

Comprehensive Audit Trails

Every database query should be logged with the querying officer's identity, timestamp, and stated purpose. Regular audits should flag suspicious patterns.

Reality check: Many departments don't audit database access at all, or only review logs after complaints.
2

Independent Oversight

Civilian oversight boards with subpoena power should review database access patterns and investigate complaints about misuse.

Reality check: Most civilian review boards lack the authority or resources to conduct meaningful oversight of internal systems.
3

Whistleblower Protections

Strong legal protections for employees who report colleague misconduct, including anonymous reporting channels and anti-retaliation measures.

Reality check: Police culture often punishes whistleblowers. The "blue wall of silence" persists in many departments.
4

Transparent Disciplinary Records

Public access to officer disciplinary histories so patterns of misconduct can be identified before they escalate to criminal activity.

Reality check: Many states seal police disciplinary records, making it impossible to identify repeat offenders.
5

Access Controls and Segmentation

Not every employee needs access to every system. Role-based access controls limit who can query what databases.

Reality check: The AP investigation found dispatchers, clerks, and non-sworn staff often have broad access they don't need.
6

Background Reinvestigation

Periodic reinvestigation of employees with access to sensitive systems, not just one-time checks at hiring.

Reality check: Many departments only conduct background checks at initial hiring, missing employees who develop problems later.

Notice What's Missing?

"Encrypt the radio" doesn't appear on any list of insider threat prevention best practices. That's because encryption addresses the wrong problem. It blocks the public, not corrupt employees.

Take Action for Transparency

Your voice matters. Here are concrete ways to advocate for open police communications in your community.

📧

Contact Your Representatives

Use our templates to email your local officials about police radio encryption policies.

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Read Case Studies

See how encryption has affected real communities - from Highland Park to Chicago.

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Spread Awareness

Share evidence about police radio encryption with your network and community.

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See the Evidence

Review the facts, myths, and research on police radio encryption.

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Public Testimony

Learn how to speak effectively at city council and public safety meetings.

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Download Resources

Get FOIA templates, talking points, and materials for advocacy.

Access Toolkit

What You Can Do

Request Database Audit Logs

File FOIA requests for database access audit reports. Ask how many queries were flagged for review and what the outcomes were.

Demand Internal Controls

At city council meetings, ask what controls exist to prevent database misuse. Push for independent audits of access patterns.

Support Whistleblower Protections

Advocate for strong legal protections for law enforcement employees who report misconduct by colleagues.

Oppose Encryption as Security Theater

When departments cite "security" for encryption, point to insider threat cases. Ask how encryption would have prevented any of them.

The Real Question

If a department truly cared about security, would it implement audit trails, oversight, and access controls? Or would it block public monitoring while leaving internal access unchanged?

Encryption is about control, not security. Don't let departments hide behind security theater while the real threats continue unchecked.

Sources