Do Criminals Use Police Scanners?
It's the most common justification for encryption: "Criminals monitor scanners to evade police." But what does the evidence actually show? Let's examine this claim with the scrutiny it deserves.
The Short Answer
Yes, some criminals have used scanners. No, it's not a significant public safety issue.
In 70+ years of open police radio access, criminal scanner use has been:
- Rare and largely anecdotal
- Ineffective against modern police tactics
- Far less useful than social media, apps, and lookouts
- Not correlated with crime rates or clearance rates
The claim that scanners significantly help criminals doesn't survive contact with evidence.
The Argument for Encryption
"Drug dealers, gang members, and other criminals monitor police scanners to know when officers are coming. They can evade arrest, destroy evidence, and stay one step ahead of law enforcement. Encryption prevents criminals from using our own communications against us."
— Common law enforcement argument for encryption
This argument is emotionally compelling. No one wants to help criminals. But policy should be based on evidence, not anecdotes. So let's look at what we actually know.
What the Evidence Shows
No Statistical Correlation
If scanner access helped criminals significantly, we'd expect to see differences in crime rates or clearance rates between encrypted and non-encrypted jurisdictions.
70 Years of Open Radio
Police radio has been publicly accessible since the 1930s. If scanner monitoring gave criminals a significant advantage, we would have seen this documented extensively over seven decades.
Modern Criminals Don't Need Scanners
Today's criminal networks use far more effective tools than police scanners:
- Encrypted messaging apps (Signal, Telegram)
- Social media for real-time information
- Human lookouts and spotters
- Counter-surveillance technology
- Corrupt insiders (far more valuable than scanners)
Tactical Operations Already Encrypted
Planned operations—raids, stings, warrant service—already use encrypted tactical channels or cell phone coordination. The routine patrol traffic that encryption hides isn't what criminals would find useful anyway.
The Reality of Criminal Operations
Let's think through what scanner-based crime evasion would actually require—and why it's largely impractical for most criminal activity.
For Drug Dealing
The scanner theory:
"Dealer hears dispatch send officers to their corner, packs up and moves before police arrive."
The reality:
- Most drug enforcement uses undercover officers and planned operations (already encrypted channels)
- Patrol officers responding to citizen complaints are unpredictable
- Human lookouts are faster and more reliable than scanner monitoring
- Encrypted messaging apps coordinate dealer networks more effectively
For Burglary/Robbery
The scanner theory:
"Burglar monitors scanner to know where officers are, hits houses in areas without patrol coverage."
The reality:
- Burglars work in minutes; patrol patterns change constantly
- Scanner monitoring requires constant attention during the crime
- Most burglars are opportunistic, not tactical planners
- Ring cameras and neighborhood apps are bigger concerns for criminals
For Organized Crime
The scanner theory:
"Criminal organizations use scanners for counter-surveillance during major operations."
The reality:
- Major operations use encrypted tactical channels anyway
- Sophisticated organizations have better intelligence sources
- Corrupt insiders provide more valuable information than scanners
- Professional criminals invest in encrypted communications, not scanners
For Fleeing Suspects
The scanner theory:
"Suspect on the run monitors scanner to evade pursuing officers."
The reality:
- Active pursuits happen in minutes; no time to set up scanner
- Driving while monitoring scanner is impractical
- Helicopters, GPS, and K-9 units don't announce positions on main channels
- Most pursuits end quickly regardless of scanner access
The Anecdote Problem
When pushed for evidence, encryption proponents often cite anecdotes: "I know of a case where..." or "We've heard from officers that..." This is understandable— individual stories are compelling. But anecdotes don't make policy.
Selection Bias
Officers remember the rare cases where scanner monitoring might have helped criminals. They don't track the thousands of cases where open radio had no negative impact.
Assumed Causation
"The suspect fled just before we arrived" becomes attributed to scanner monitoring when there are many other explanations (lookouts, coincidence, routine caution).
No Control Group
Without comparing encrypted vs. non-encrypted jurisdictions systematically, we can't know if encryption actually changes criminal behavior.
Survivorship Bias
We hear about criminals who weren't caught. We don't hear about the vast majority who were caught despite having theoretical access to scanners.
What Criminals Actually Use
If we want to understand criminal counter-surveillance, we should look at what actually works for them—not what sounds scary in a press release.
Encrypted Messaging
Signal, Telegram, WhatsApp—encrypted apps are the primary communication tool for organized crime. They're free, easy, and actually secure.
Human Lookouts
Spotters on corners, in cars, or at windows provide real-time, targeted intelligence far superior to scanning hundreds of radio transmissions.
Social Media
Police activity, mugshots, and investigations are shared instantly on social platforms. Far more accessible than scanner monitoring.
Insider Information
Corrupt employees, compromised officers, or connected individuals provide targeted intelligence no scanner can match.
Police Scanners
Requires equipment, knowledge, constant monitoring, and provides only general information. Largely obsolete as a criminal tool.
The Real Trade-Off
Even if we accept that some criminals have benefited from scanner access (they probably have, occasionally), the policy question is about trade-offs:
What We Give Up
- Real-time public safety information during emergencies
- Journalist ability to cover breaking news
- Community oversight of police activity
- Accountability for response times and conduct
- Research data for improving policing
- Evidence of police misconduct
What We Get
- Prevention of rare, unquantified criminal scanner use
- Protection already available via tactical channels
- Marginal reduction in criminal information access
- No documented improvement in crime rates
This isn't a close call. The documented harms of encryption far outweigh the theoretical benefits of preventing criminal scanner monitoring—especially when sensitive operations can already be encrypted on tactical channels.
The Timing Question
If criminal scanner use were a serious problem, we'd expect encryption to have been a priority for decades. Instead, the push for blanket encryption accelerated dramatically after 2020—after high-profile police accountability incidents.
Ask yourself:
Were criminals suddenly using scanners more effectively in 2020? Or did something else happen that made police departments want to hide their communications from public oversight?
The timing suggests that accountability avoidance—not criminal scanner use—is the real driver of the encryption push. Criminal scanner monitoring is the justification, not the motivation.
Frequently Asked Questions
Do criminals actually use police scanners?
While some criminals have used scanners, it's extremely rare and largely ineffective. Modern police use encrypted tactical channels for sensitive operations, cell phones for coordination, and unpredictable response patterns. The 70+ year history of open radio shows scanner-based crime evasion is not a significant public safety issue.
Didn't drug dealers use scanners in the past?
Some did, though documentation is largely anecdotal. More importantly, police adapted with tactical channels, coded language, and cell coordination - rendering scanner monitoring mostly useless for criminal purposes. Today's criminals rely on social media, encrypted messaging apps, and lookouts - not scanners.
If even one criminal uses a scanner, isn't that reason enough to encrypt?
This logic would justify eliminating any public information that could theoretically be misused. Traffic cameras, flight trackers, public court records - all could theoretically help criminals. The question is proportionality: does the rare, limited benefit to criminals outweigh the massive loss of public oversight? Evidence says no.
Why don't police want the public to know about scanner limitations?
Because acknowledging that scanners pose minimal criminal risk undermines the primary justification for encryption. If the public understood that modern police communications already protect sensitive operations, the accountability concerns would dominate the debate - and that's exactly what some departments want to avoid.
What about mass shooters monitoring scanners?
This is often cited but poorly supported by evidence. Mass shooters typically aren't strategic planners responding to police movements - most incidents last minutes and end in surrender, suicide, or confrontation. The Highland Park shooter, operating in an area with open scanners, was captured via citizen tips and roadside observation, not police radio.
Could terrorists use scanners to plan attacks?
Sophisticated terrorist organizations have resources far beyond consumer scanners - they can intercept encrypted communications, use insider information, and deploy counter-surveillance. The idea that blanket encryption stops terrorists while eliminating public oversight is security theater. Tactical operations already use encrypted channels when needed.
The Bottom Line
Yes, some criminals have used police scanners. Some criminals also use public roads, cash, and cell phones. The question isn't whether a tool can be misused—it's whether the misuse is significant enough to justify eliminating a vital public transparency mechanism.
The evidence says no. Criminal scanner use is:
- Rare — Documented cases are largely anecdotal
- Ineffective — Modern criminals have better tools
- Already addressed — Tactical channels protect sensitive ops
- Not correlated with outcomes — No proof encryption helps
The "criminals use scanners" argument is a convenient justification for policies that serve other purposes. It sounds plausible until you look at the evidence. When you do, it collapses.