Evidence Analysis

The Victim Privacy Argument: Examined

"We need encryption to protect victim privacy." It sounds compelling—even compassionate. But does encryption actually protect victims, or does it just protect police from oversight of how they handle victim calls?

The Concern Is Real

Victim privacy matters. Domestic violence survivors, sexual assault victims, and other vulnerable people deserve protection. No reasonable person disputes this.

When police departments argue for encryption on victim privacy grounds, they're appealing to a genuine value. The question isn't whether victim privacy matters—it's whether blanket encryption is the right tool to protect it, and whether it actually does what proponents claim.

The Claim

"Without encryption, victim information is broadcast publicly. Abusers could monitor scanners to track when police respond to their victims. Encryption prevents criminals from using police communications against the very people police are trying to help."

What the Evidence Actually Shows

đź“»

Current Protocols Already Protect Privacy

Professional police departments haven't broadcast victim names over radio for decades. Modern radio traffic uses:

  • Address-only dispatches ("Respond to 123 Oak Street")
  • Call type codes (10-codes or numeric codes)
  • Unit numbers rather than personal information
  • Mobile data terminals (MDTs) for sensitive details

When departments cite "victim privacy" as a reason for encryption, they're describing a problem that competent departments solved long before digital encryption existed.

đź“Š

No Documented Cases

Despite police scanning being freely available for 70+ years, there is no documented pattern of:

  • Abusers using scanners to track victim locations
  • Criminals intercepting victim information from radio traffic
  • Victims being harmed because their calls were broadcast

If scanner monitoring posed a genuine threat to victims, we would expect to see documented cases after seven decades of open radio access. We don't.

⚖️

Encryption Removes Accountability

What encryption definitively does is prevent oversight of how police respond to victim calls:

  • Did officers respond promptly to a domestic violence call?
  • Was the victim taken seriously by dispatchers?
  • Did police follow up appropriately?
  • Were there warning signs that were missed?

When journalists, advocates, and researchers can't monitor police communications, they can't document failures that put victims at risk. Encryption protects police from accountability for how they handle the very calls it claims to protect.

The Scenario That Never Happens

The victim privacy argument rests on a specific scenario: an abuser monitoring police scanners to track when officers respond to their victim. Let's examine what this would actually require.

1

Own and operate a police scanner

The abuser must acquire scanning equipment and learn to use it

2

Know the victim's exact address

Required to recognize relevant radio traffic among hundreds of daily calls

3

Monitor continuously

Must be actively listening at the exact moment the victim calls police

4

Act faster than police

Must reach the location before responding officers arrive

5

Avoid detection

Must do all this without being caught by the responding officers

This elaborate scenario—requiring constant monitoring, precise timing, and faster response than police—has produced zero documented cases in decades of open scanner access.

Meanwhile, the real threats to victim safety are well-documented: slow police response, failure to take reports seriously, inadequate follow-up, and systemic dismissal of victim concerns. Encryption makes all of these problems harder to identify and address.

What Actually Endangers Victims

If we genuinely care about victim safety, we should focus on documented harms rather than theoretical scenarios. The evidence is clear about what actually puts victims at risk.

Documented & Ongoing

  • Slow police response times Officers arriving too late to prevent harm
  • Dismissive treatment of victims Reports not taken, concerns minimized
  • Failure to enforce restraining orders Known protection orders ignored
  • Inadequate investigation Cases closed without proper follow-up
  • Re-traumatization during reporting Victims blamed or disbelieved

Theoretical & Undocumented

  • Scanner-based victim tracking No verified cases in 70+ years
  • Criminal exploitation of radio traffic Theoretical scenario, no evidence
  • Identity exposure via broadcast Addressed by existing protocols

Encryption addresses the theoretical column while making the documented column impossible to monitor or address. When journalists can't track police response to DV calls, when advocates can't document patterns of dismissive treatment, when researchers can't analyze response times—victims lose the accountability mechanisms that actually protect them.

When Accountability Saved Lives

The Power of Documented Evidence

In 2016, investigative journalists in Buffalo, New York used scanner access and records requests to document a pattern: domestic violence calls in certain neighborhoods received significantly slower police response than identical calls in wealthier areas.

This accountability journalism—made possible by open scanner access—led to:

  • Policy changes prioritizing DV response
  • Reallocation of patrol resources
  • Improved response times in underserved areas
  • Public awareness of systemic disparities

Under encryption, this disparity would remain hidden. Victims in those neighborhoods would continue receiving slower response, with no one able to document or challenge the pattern.

The Proportionality Problem

Even if we accepted the premise that scanner access poses some theoretical risk to victims, blanket encryption is a disproportionate response.

The "Problem"

Theoretical risk of abusers monitoring scanners (zero documented cases in 70 years)

→

The "Solution"

Encrypt all police communications, eliminating oversight for all calls including victim safety, journalist access, and community awareness

This is like banning all windows in houses because a burglar might theoretically look inside. The theoretical benefit doesn't justify the comprehensive cost to transparency and accountability.

What Actually Protects Victims

If victim protection is the genuine goal, there are proven approaches that don't require eliminating public oversight.

MDT-Based Sensitive Information

Personal details transmitted via encrypted mobile data terminals, not voice radio. This protects victim information while keeping tactical communications open.

Already Standard Practice

Address-Only Dispatching

Calls dispatched by location and code, not victim name. "Respond to a 10-16 at 123 Oak Street" reveals nothing about the caller's identity.

Already Standard Practice

Delayed Public Access

Brief delays (5-15 minutes) on public feeds while maintaining real-time access for credentialed media. Balances safety with accountability.

Viable Alternative

Enhanced Victim Services

Invest in victim advocates, faster response times, and better training. These actually protect victims rather than protecting departments from oversight.

Best Practice

The Question We Should Be Asking

The victim privacy argument for encryption asks us to accept a trade: give up accountability for police handling of victim calls in exchange for theoretical protection from scenarios that have never been documented.

But here's what we should be asking: If encryption truly protected victims, why did victim advocacy organizations largely oppose or remain silent on police encryption initiatives?

Organizations that work with domestic violence survivors, sexual assault victims, and other vulnerable populations know that police accountability is essential to victim safety. They know that the danger isn't scanner-monitoring criminals—it's police departments that fail to respond appropriately, and the inability of anyone to document those failures.

Victim privacy is important. It's already protected by existing protocols. Blanket encryption doesn't add victim protection—it removes police accountability for how victim calls are handled.

That's not victim advocacy. That's institutional self-protection marketed as compassion.

Frequently Asked Questions

Doesn't police encryption protect domestic violence victims?

Current radio protocols already protect victim identity through address-only dispatches and coded language. Encryption doesn't add protection—it removes accountability for how officers handle these sensitive calls. The real risk to DV victims comes from poor police response, which encryption makes impossible to monitor.

What about broadcasting victim names over the radio?

Professional police departments haven't broadcast victim names for decades. Radio traffic uses addresses, unit numbers, and call codes. The privacy concern is largely theoretical—there's no epidemic of victims being harmed because their names were on scanner traffic. This argument misrepresents how modern police communications actually work.

Can't criminals use scanners to track victim locations?

This scenario requires a criminal to: own a scanner, know the victim's address to recognize relevant traffic, monitor continuously, and act faster than responding officers. There are no documented cases of this happening. Meanwhile, encryption definitively prevents journalists from documenting police failures to protect victims.

Why do advocates oppose encryption if it might protect even one victim?

Because encryption demonstrably harms victims by eliminating oversight. When police fail to respond, arrive late, or mishandle calls, no one knows. The theoretical benefit (unproven victim protection) doesn't outweigh the documented harm (reduced police accountability for the very calls encryption claims to protect).