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EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE

Officer Safety and Police Scanners: The Truth

"Criminals use scanners to ambush officers." It's the most emotionally charged argument for police radio encryption. When asked for evidence, departments rarely name an incident. We know of no named, documented case of a criminal using a scanner to harm an officer; a 2022 CISA paper describes anonymized examples without naming a city, date or agency (CISA, January 2022).

Officer safety is a real concern

Officer safety is a legitimate concern. Police officers face real dangers, and any policy that could genuinely protect them deserves serious consideration.

The question is whether encryption actually improves officer safety, or whether this claim is being used to justify a policy choice driven by other motivations.

The evidence strongly suggests the latter.

The claim

Police departments and unions frequently say that criminals monitor scanners to:

  • Ambush responding officers
  • Evade arrest by knowing police locations
  • Target officers' homes by learning their identities
  • Interfere with tactical operations

These claims sound plausible. If true, they'd justify encryption. So what does the evidence actually show?

The evidence: no named, documented case

Palo Alto's answer to a records request

In May 2021, months after Palo Alto encrypted on Jan. 7, 2021, the Palo Alto Daily Post reported that it had asked the city for any report from January 2018 to January 2021 of a crime in which a suspect was aided by a police scanner or police radio.

Result: "No responsive records"

The city added that its police department "does not keep a statistic of that information," so the answer shows no such record was found, not that no case occurred. Mountain View and Los Altos, asked by the same paper, offered no instances either (Palo Alto Daily Post, May 28, 2021).

What Broadcastify's founder says

Broadcastify streams scanner feeds to the public, including official feeds that more than 150 public-safety agencies provided directly as of 2020 (Built In). If scanner access endangered officers, Broadcastify would be exhibit A in any argument for encryption.

Founder's statement: "We've never had a law enforcement agency present us with evidence that we've put officers in danger by what we do."

Lindsay Blanton, Broadcastify founder, to Built In, June 23, 2020.

What happens when departments are asked directly

When community members and journalists ask police officials for specific cases during city council meetings or public hearings, a consistent pattern emerges:

Typical response: "We don't have specific cases to cite"

Department after department, when pressed, cannot produce documentation for the claim.

Where's the evidence?

If criminals were regularly using scanners to harm officers, we'd expect to find at least some of the following:

Incident reports

Police incident reports documenting scanner use in crimes

Not found

Criminal prosecutions

Cases where scanner monitoring was cited as criminal methodology

Not found

Officer testimony

Specific officer accounts of scanner-facilitated ambushes

Not found

Academic research

Studies documenting scanner use in criminal activity

Not found

News coverage

Media reports of scanner-related attacks on officers

Not found

FBI/DOJ reports

Federal documentation of scanner-related officer endangerment

Not found

The complete absence of evidence across 70+ years of open scanner access is itself significant. If this were a real and recurring problem, someone would have documented it by now.

How criminals actually evade police

The scanner-ambush narrative ignores how criminal evasion actually works. People avoiding police have faster, easier methods available:

Lookouts

A person with a cell phone watching the street is faster and more reliable than monitoring radio traffic.

Waze and traffic apps

Real-time police location data, no frequency knowledge required.

Social media

Community networks share police activity faster than official radio dispatch does.

Looking out the window

Marked police cars are visible. No technology needed.

Using a scanner requires knowing the right frequencies, understanding police codes and terminology, and paying constant attention. It's far more work than any of these alternatives. That's why criminals don't bother.

What the timeline tells us

If scanner access endangered officers, departments would have pushed for encryption decades ago. The actual timeline points somewhere else:

1920s–2019 Open police scanners are standard. We know of no named, documented scanner-related officer harm from this period.
Summer 2020 George Floyd protests. Open scanners document police conduct during civil unrest in real time.
2020–present Police encryption accelerates rapidly across the country.

The encryption surge correlates with accountability pressure, not a sudden officer safety crisis. The technology existed for years. What changed in 2020 wasn't scanner capabilities — it was what the scanners were capturing.

Why this matters

The officer safety argument is emotionally powerful but unsupported by evidence. That gap has real consequences:

  • Policy should be evidence-based. Claims that sound reasonable but can't be documented shouldn't drive major changes to public transparency infrastructure.
  • The real motivations become clearer. When the stated justification has no evidence, it's worth asking what's actually driving the policy. The timing points to accountability concerns, not safety.
  • Resources are being misallocated. Departments are spending millions on encryption infrastructure aimed at an officer-harm problem with no named, documented case behind it, while genuine officer safety needs may go unfunded.
  • Public trust erodes. When departments make claims they can't substantiate, their credibility on other issues suffers too.

Questions to ask at your next public meeting

When your police department proposes encryption citing officer safety, put these directly on the record:

  1. "Can you provide documentation of any specific incident where scanner access endangered an officer in this department?"
  2. "Has any law enforcement agency documented cases of scanner-related officer harm?"
  3. "If this is a known problem, why did encryption only become urgent after 2020?"
  4. "What evidence would change your position on this claim?"

The answers — or more often, the inability to provide them — tell you what you need to know about the evidentiary basis for encryption.

Frequently Asked Questions

Have criminals ever used police scanners to ambush officers?

We know of no named, documented case of an ambush. A January 2022 CISA paper describes anonymized examples of listeners endangering officers, without naming the city, date or agency. When the Palo Alto Daily Post asked for any report from January 2018 to January 2021 of a crime aided by a police scanner, Palo Alto said it had no responsive records (it does not keep that statistic). Mountain View and Los Altos, asked by the same newspaper, offered no instances.

Why do police departments claim scanners are a safety risk without naming a case?

The claim sounds reasonable and has never been seriously challenged in most budget meetings, so departments keep using it. It's repeated because it's emotionally compelling, not because it's supported by data. Departments also benefit from the reduced public oversight that comes with encryption.

Did Broadcastify find any cases of scanner-related officer harm?

Not that it has disclosed. Its founder, Lindsay Blanton, told Built In in June 2020: 'We've never had a law enforcement agency present us with evidence that we've put officers in danger by what we do.'

How do criminals actually evade police?

Methods that are faster and require far less effort: human lookouts, Waze and similar apps that show real-time police locations, social media, and plain observation of marked cars. Using a scanner requires knowing frequencies, decoding police radio language, and monitoring continuously. Nobody's doing that when a lookout with a cell phone works better.

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