P25 Interoperability Assessment
For Fire Chiefs Speaking to Technical Audiences
When police encrypt, fire/EMS interoperability suffers. This technical briefing provides the detail you need to explain why to council members, city managers, and other stakeholders who may not understand radio system architecture.
P25 Encryption Fundamentals
Understanding what encryption does to your radio system
What P25 Encryption Does
P25 (Project 25) is the digital radio standard used by most public safety agencies. When a department enables encryption, all transmissions on encrypted channels are scrambled using AES-256 encryption. Only radios programmed with the correct encryption key can decode the transmissions.
Key Management Challenge
Every radio that needs to receive encrypted transmissions must have the encryption key loaded. This includes mutual aid partners, fire departments, EMS, and any other agency that previously monitored police channels. Key distribution and rotation becomes an ongoing administrative burden.
Patching Complications
Radio patches allow different talkgroups or channels to be connected during incidents. When one agency encrypts and another doesn't, patching becomes complex or impossible. The unencrypted side can't decode encrypted transmissions, and the encrypted side may not accept unencrypted traffic.
System Architecture Changes
Implementing encryption may require console upgrades, radio reprogramming, new key loading infrastructure, and changes to dispatch protocols. These costs are often underestimated in initial proposals.
Interoperability Failure Scenarios
What happens when police encrypt and fire/EMS don't
Rescue Task Force Operations
The problem: Modern active shooter response uses Rescue Task Forces - integrated teams of law enforcement and fire/EMS. Fire personnel enter with police to treat victims while the scene is still active.
With encryption: Fire/EMS on the RTF can't hear police channel updates about shooter location, room clearing status, or emerging threats. They rely entirely on verbal relay from the police officer next to them, creating dangerous delays and information gaps.
Documented example: Multiple fire departments have reported RTF training exercises revealing communication breakdowns when police channels are encrypted.
First-In Police Units
The problem: Police often arrive first at structure fires, performing crowd control, witness interviews, and initial size-up. Fire command benefits from hearing this information.
With encryption: Fire command loses access to police observations about occupant status, access routes, crowd issues, or potential hazards (like dogs, weapons, or suspicious materials). Information must be relayed through dispatch, adding delay.
Impact: Slower scene size-up, potential safety hazards not communicated in time.
Unified Command
The problem: Mass casualty incidents require unified command with police, fire, and EMS working from the same information picture. NIMS/ICS depends on shared situational awareness.
With encryption: The fire/EMS branch can't monitor police activities. Unified command becomes fragmented. Incident commanders must rely on verbal updates that are inherently delayed and incomplete.
Documented example: DC Fire's coordination failures at subway incidents when police were encrypted led to reversal of their own encryption decision.
Highway Incidents
The problem: Fire/EMS responding to highway accidents benefit from police information about lane blockages, number of vehicles, patient status from first-arriving units, and traffic control needs.
With encryption: Responding units arrive with less information. They can't hear police updates about scene dynamics, secondary accidents, or hazmat concerns reported by police.
Impact: Reduced response efficiency, potential safety issues from limited advance information.
Technical Case Studies
Documented interoperability failures
DC Fire Subway Incident
LED TO ENCRYPTION REVERSALIncident: Metro subway incident requiring fire/EMS response with police scene security.
Communication failure: Fire command couldn't monitor Metro PD encrypted channels. Information about scene status, access points, and hazards had to be relayed through dispatch, creating critical delays.
Result: DC Fire leadership ultimately advocated for reversing their own encryption after experiencing how encryption complicated multi-agency coordination.
Lesson: Encryption problems become apparent during real incidents, not training exercises. The DC Fire reversal demonstrates that even departments that initially supported encryption can change position when they experience the operational impacts.
Toms River Fire District 1
ONGOING CONCERNSSituation: In January 2025, Toms River Fire District 1 became New Jersey's only fully encrypted fire department, following police encryption.
Opposition: Fire chiefs across Ocean County formally opposed the decision in February 2024. The Ocean County Fire Chiefs Association documented interoperability concerns.
Current status: Neighboring departments required to sign NDAs. Officials issued gag orders. Full impact on mutual aid coordination unknown due to information restrictions.
Lesson: When police encrypt, there's pressure for fire to follow. This creates cascading interoperability problems across the entire emergency response system.
Read full investigationCouncil Presentation Materials
Technical content for non-technical audiences
Opening Statement
"The fire service depends on hearing what police are doing at incident scenes. When police encrypt their radios, we lose that awareness. This isn't a technology preference - it's an operational safety issue.
At active shooter scenes, structure fires, vehicle accidents, and mass casualty events, fire and EMS personnel need to know what police are seeing and doing. Encryption creates information barriers that slow our response and increase risk to our personnel and the public."
On Rescue Task Forces
"Modern active shooter response integrates fire/EMS with law enforcement. Our personnel enter buildings with police officers while threats may still exist. They need to hear police communications to know where it's safe. Encryption breaks that."
On Unified Command
"NIMS and ICS require shared situational awareness across all agencies. When we can't hear police channels, unified command becomes fragmented. We're working from different information, and that creates gaps."
On Workarounds
"Yes, information can be relayed through dispatch. But that adds delay, loses context, and increases radio traffic. In fast-moving incidents, verbal relay through a third party is not an adequate substitute for direct monitoring."
On Key Sharing
"Some suggest giving fire departments encryption keys. But key management is complex. What about mutual aid departments? Volunteer departments? Every radio that needs the key creates security and administrative burden. And if keys are shared widely, the security rationale for encryption is undermined."
On Alternatives
"Hybrid systems can encrypt genuinely tactical operations - SWAT, undercover - while keeping routine dispatch open. This protects sensitive operations without eliminating the interoperability we depend on for normal incidents."
On DC Fire
"DC Fire encrypted their radios, then reversed the decision after experiencing coordination failures at multi-agency incidents. They learned through experience what we're warning about here."
Chief-to-Chief Advocacy
Approaching your police chief collegially
Framing the Conversation
This isn't about opposing the police department. It's about maintaining the interoperability that benefits both agencies. Approach the conversation as a collaborative problem-solving discussion, not an adversarial debate.
Suggested Approach
- Acknowledge legitimate concerns: "I understand there may be reasons you're considering encryption. I'm not here to dismiss those."
- Raise operational impacts: "I want to make sure we think through how this affects multi-agency incidents where we work together."
- Propose joint planning: "Can we walk through some scenarios together and make sure we have workable solutions?"
- Suggest alternatives: "Have you looked at hybrid approaches that might address your concerns while preserving our coordination?"
Finding Common Ground
- Shared goal: Both agencies want effective incident response
- Mutual aid: Both agencies participate in regional mutual aid that depends on interoperability
- Training investment: Both agencies have invested in joint training (RTF, NIMS) that encryption complicates
- Accountability: Both agencies face public scrutiny for incident response performance
Hybrid System Proposal
If full opposition isn't viable, propose a hybrid approach:
- Encrypt genuinely tactical channels (SWAT, undercover)
- Keep routine dispatch channels open
- Establish clear criteria for what's "tactical"
- Regular review of what's being encrypted
- Fire/EMS representation in encryption policy decisions
This compromise protects legitimately sensitive operations while preserving routine interoperability.
Take Action for Transparency
Your voice matters. Here are concrete ways to advocate for open police communications in your community.
Contact Your Representatives
Use our templates to email your local officials about police radio encryption policies.
Get StartedRead Case Studies
See how encryption has affected real communities - from Highland Park to Chicago.
View CasesSpread Awareness
Share evidence about police radio encryption with your network and community.
Public Testimony
Learn how to speak effectively at city council and public safety meetings.
Prepare to Speak